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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
PRESENT TAXABLE STATUS OF STOCK DIVIDENDS
IN FEDERAL LAW*
HENRY ROTTSCHAEFER**
T IIE CONSTITUTION of the United States conferred upon Con-
gress a general power to tax. That power was expressly made
subject to certain limitations and conditions. Thus, taxes on ex-
ports were specifically prohibited,' and subsequent judicial con-
struction prevented the imposition of taxes that would tnduly
inpede the exercise by the states of their governmental functions.'
The principal conditions imposed were that direct taxes must be
apportioned among the states on the basis of their respective
populations, 3 and that indirect taxes had to be uniform throughout
the United States.4 The sole reason for the constitutional classi-
fication of federal taxes into direct and indirect was that their
levy was to be subject to these two diverse rules. It is unnecessary
for present purposes to review the decisions of even the Supreme
Court of the United States searching for a test of a direct tax.
There does not exist even now a logically adequate judicial defini-
tion thereof, nor even a comprehensive enumeration of the taxes
includible in that constitutional category of taxes. It is sufficient
for present purposes that the Supreme Court decided in the
Pollock Case1, that an income tax on the income from property
sources was a direct tax. That decision made any kind of federal
income tax a practical, though not a legal, impossibility The
decision was directly responsible for the proposal and ultimate
ratification of the 16th Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
The 16th Amendment conferred upon Congress the power "to
lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,
without apportionment among the several states, and without re-
gard to any census or enumeration." The influence of the decision
*This article will also be published in the January issue of the North
Carolina Law Review.
**Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1U. S. C. A., Constitution, Article 1, Section 9.
2See Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law, pp. 96-110.
3U. S. C. A., Constitution, Article 1, Sections 2 and 9.
4U. S. C. A.. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1.5Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., (1895) 157 U. S. 429, 15 S. Ct.
673, 39 L. Ed. 759; Id., (1895) 158 U. S. 601, 15 S. Ct. 912, 39 L. Ed. 1108.
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in the Pollock Cases is self-evident. Its minimum purpose and
effect was to relieve taxes upon income from property sources
from the apportionment requirement applicable to direct taxes.
Rent, interest, and ordinary dividends, were the principal types
of such income. It had been decided long before the Pollock Cases
that a tax on income from non-property sources was an indirect
tax.' The ratification of the 16th Amendment thus made it con-
stitutionally possible for Congress to levy a general income tax
that would not flout current theories of justice in the field of
taxation. There is nothing in its language that would normally
suggest that it was intended to change the constitutional char-
acter of an income tax on income from property sources from a
direct tax into an indirect tax or excise. This transmutation was,
however, effected by the Supreme Court in Bruisaber v. Union
Pacifc R. R. Co.7 The reasoning by which this result was reached
is quite turgid, and contains some rather uncomplimentary impli-
cations for the majority of the Supreme Court in the Pollock Cases.
It is, however, the only reasonable inference from that reasoning.
The result is that all federal income taxes laid after the adoption
of the 16th Amendment are indirect taxes or excises. That Amend-
ment did not, however, transfer to the constitutional category of
excises any taxes theretofore includible in the class of direct taxes
other than those direct taxes that can properly be described as
taxes on income. A capital levy, for example, could be held an
excse by reasoning based on the 16th Amendment only if the
Supreme Court were prepared to hold that it was a tax on income.
This does not mean, however, that it could not redefine the terms
"direct tax" and "excise" so as to exclude a capital levy from
the forier and include it in the latter class. Any tax imposed by
Congress which does not conform to the apportionment require-
ment applicable to-direct taxes will, of course, be invalid if held
to be a direct tax. If, however, the tax results from the inclusion
of certain receipts in income in connection with an income tax, a
successful attack can be made on it on the score that it violates
that apportionment requirement only by establishing (a) that the
receipt did not constitute income, and (b) that the tax on its
receipt is a direct tax. That is, it does not follow from the fact
that the receipt does not constitute income within the meaning of
the 16th Amendment that the tax thereon is direct. That it is such
may require argument directly concerned with the constitutional
GSpringer v. United States, (1881) 102 U. S. 586, 26 L. Ed. 253.
7(1916) 240 U. S. 1, 36 S. Ct. 236, 60 L. Ed. 493, L. R. A. 1917D. 414.
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meaning of "direct tax." This consideration is of some consequence
in connection with the issue to which this article is devoted. Proof
that stock dividends of the type involved in Eisner v. Macomber8
are not income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment is not
logically the equivalent of proof that the tax thereon in connection
with an income tax, or some other tax designed to tax ,that same
increment of wealth, are direct taxes. However, the principal con-
stitutional issue usually debated in connection with attempts to
subject such dividends to a federal income tax has been whether
they constitute income within the meaning of that amendment.
The subsequent discussion will take this into account, so far as it
considers the constitutional aspects of the subject.
STATUS UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
The status of stock dividends in the federal income tax system
has once more become an issue because of several important deci-
sions rendered by the Supreme Court during its last term.9 The
character of those issues can be set forth best by a descriptive
account of these decisions. The first, and from many aspects the
most important, is that of Helvernig v. Griffiths.10 The ,taxpayer
was the owner of common stock of A Co. During his taxable year
1939 he received a dividend thereon payable in common of pre-
cisely the same kind as that with respect to which the dividend was
paid. That was the only class of A Co. stock outstanding at the
time when the dividend was declared and paid. The amount trans-
ferred by A Co. from surplus to capital stock in connection with
the declaration and payment of the stock dividend was less than
its earned surplus accumulated since February 28, 1913. The pay-
ment of the dividend would, therefore, have been taxable if a
stock dividend of this character satisfied both the constitutional
and statutory tests. of taxable income. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue assessed an additional tax based on including in
the taxpayer's 1939 income an amount equal to the fair market
value of the dividend shares at the time of their receipt. The tax-
payer appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals which sustained his
8(1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189. 64 L. Ed. 521.
OHelvering v. Griffiths, (1943) 318 U. S. 371, 63 S. Ct. 636, 87 L. Ed.
...... Helvering v. Sprouse, (1943) 318 U. S. 604, 63 S. Ct. 791, 87 L. Ed.
...... Strassburger v. Com'r of Int. Revenue, (1943) 318 U. S. 604, 63 S. Ct.
791. 87 L. Ed ........lOThis case will be hereinafter referred to as the Griffiths Case, Helver-
ing v. Sprouse will be hereinafter referred to as the Sprouse Case; and
Strassburger v. Com'r of Int. Revenue will be hereinafter referred to as the
Strassburger Case.
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position that he had realized no income by the receipt of the divi-
dend. It in turn was sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit." It is the Supreme Court's decision in tis
case, and the prevailing and dissenting opinions therein, that con-
stitute the new point of departure for any consideration of tile
present status of stock dividends in the federal income tax system.
The facts of the Griffith Case were on all fours with those
of Eisner v. Macomber ': The Commissioner was thus making a
direct attack upon that case. He undoubtedly based his hopes of
having that landmark overruled in no small part upon a change in
the personnel of the Supreme Court during the last decade. The
majority of the Court has at least postponed the time when its
members will have to take their stand for or against the Macomber
Case by holding that the stock dividends in question were ex-
cludible from gross income as a matter of statutory construction.
Eisner v. .Macomlyer was decided in 1920. The Revenue Act of
1921, enacted the following year,. expressly excluded all stock
dividends from taxable income.13 This provision was repeated in
every subsequent Revenue Act until that of 1936. It was then
changed to read that "A distribution made by a corporation to its
shareholders in its stock or in rights to acquire its stock shall
not be treated as a dividend to the extent that it does not con-
stitute income to the shareholder within the meaning of the Six-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution."' 4 The shift to this nar-
rower exclusion of stock dividends from the class of taxable
dividends was due to the Supreme Court's *decision in the Kosh-
land Case-" It had held thereit that a diidend on the preferred
stock of a corporation paid in its own common stock constituted
income within the 16th Amendment, and that no part of the basis
of such preferred could be validly allocated to the common stock
received as a stock dividend thereon. In the year following that
in which the Koshland Case was decided, the Court followed the
logical implications of its position therein by sustaining the
Treasury in treating the gain basis of stock dividends that could
constitutionally be treated as income as zero. 0 The Treasury's first
I"(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1942) 129 F (2d) 321.22(1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521.
13Rev. Act of 1921, Section 201 (d).
'14Rev. Act of 1936. Section 115 (f) (1). The same provision appeared
in all subsequent Revenue Acts and was carried into the Internal Revenue
Code, Section 115 (f) (1), U. S. C. A. Title 26, Section 115 (f) (1).
3SKoshland v. Helvering, (1936) 298 U. S. 441, 56 S. Ct. 767, 80 L. Ed.
1268, hereinafter.referred to as the Koshland Case.
16Helvering v. Gowran, (1937) 302 U. S. 238, 58 S. CL 154, 82 L. Ed.
224, hereinafter referred to as the Gowran Case.
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interpretation of Section 115 (f) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1936
clearly recognized that a stock dividend of the Eisner v Macomber
type had not been rendered taxable,1 7 and it construed the same
provision of the Revenue Act of 1938 and of the Internal Revenue
Code in the same manner.1 8 This construction was in force when
the dividends in the Griffiths Case were paid. In fact it remained
in force until late in 1940.1 All these facts (except that mentioned
in the sentence immediately preceding), coupled with an interpreta-
tion of expressions of members of Congress, played an important
role in leading the Court's majority to conclude that Congress in-
tended Section 115 (f) (1) to include in taxable stock dividends
only those which were income within the meaning of the 16th
Amendment as that had been judicially construed tip to the time
of the enactment of said Section in the Revenue Act of 1936. It
is not necessary for present purposes to evaluate this part of the
majority's argument. It is, hdwever, only fair to state that the
force of the Treasury's response to Section 115 (f) (1) as an
argument in favor of the majority's position depends on the
reasons that induced the Treasury to treat that Section as not
having made stock dividends of the Eisner v. Macomber type tax-
able. The language of the Regulations cited in the majority opinion
is perfectly consistent with the position that the Treasury still con-
sidered Eisner v. Macomber as a valid interpretation of the 16th
Amendment. Its Regulations, therefore, reflect its views on the
meaning of that Amendment rather than its views as to the inten-
tion of Congress. The minority's position on the meaning of Sec-
tion 115 (f) (1) is supported by it by better reasoning than that
urged by the majority to sustain its position on this point. It is
not improbable that the fact that the Treasury was giving a retro-
spective operation to its change of Regulations in the instant case
was the dominant factor in shaping the majority's decision. If the
injustice of such a retrospective application were to be avoided, it
was necessary to make the decisive issue that of the meaning of
Section 115 (f) (1) If the 16th Amendment permitted treating
stock dividends of the Eisner v Macomber type as income, and if
Section 115 (f) (1) was intended to allow the taxation of all
stock dividends that constitute 'income within that Amendment,
then the reversal of the Treasury's original Regulation construing
1'Reg. 94, Art. 115-7
"sReg. 101, Art. 115-7, Reg. 103, Sec. 19.115-7
"'Treasury Decision 5020, which amended Reg. 103, See. 19.115-7, dated
November 15, 1940. The corresponding Articles of Regulations 101 and 94
were amended by Treasury Decision 5110, dated January 19, 1942.
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that Section would be required by the Constitution itself. In that
event the Treasury would have no power to limit the change to
subsequently paid stock .dividends, since that would involve the
assertion of a poweifto ignore the Constitution. Courts sometimes
protect persons against the logical consequences of an overruling
decision, but administrators have no such power. It appears that
the Treasury used doubtful strategy il selecting its test case.
The consequences and implications of the decision in the
Griffiths Case are of considerable importance. It was a 5 to 3 deci-
sion, since Mr. Justice Rutledge did not participate in the con-
sideration or decision of the case. If the Court continues to main-
tain the position of its majority that stock dividends of the Eisner
v. '1aconzber type are non-taxable as a matter of statutory con-
struction, regardless of the constitutionality of taxing them, it will
require an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code before the
Court can even pass on the present constitutional status of that
decision. An amendment expressly including all stock dividends in
gross income would be the simplest method for according the Court
this opportunity In the meantime opinions will differ as to what
the Court would have held on that issue had the majority accepted
the minority's interpretation of Section 115 (f) (1). But the
Griffiths Case raised another important issue. A stock dividend is
presently excludible from gross income if it does not constitute
income within the 16th Amendment as construed up to the time
of the enactment of Section 115 (f) (1) of the Revenue Act of
1936. The extent of that exclusion thus depends upon the judicial
construction of that Amendment as of a given date so far as that
:onstruction involved the status of stock dividends. There would
)e no reasonable basis for resorting to decisions not involving that
natter in attempting to define the precise scope of the decision in
he Griffiths 'Case. The question then becomes one as to the extent
o which stock dividends had been held to be not income within
the 16th Amendment up to the critical date.
It would have been an easy matter to have limited the scope
of the decision to excluding from income a dividend on common
stock payable in common of the same type in a case in which no
other class of common was outstanding at the time of the declara-
tion and payment of the stock dividend. It would also have been
reasonable to limit its scope to the payment of a dividend on
common payable in common of the same type even though other
classes of stock were outstanding at the time of the declaration and
payment of the stock dividend. Both of these views as to the scope
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of the Griffiths Case would be justified by developments between
the decision of Eisner v. Macomber and the date of the enactment
of Section 115 (f) (1) This has not been what the Supreme Court
has done. The reason therefor, and for the dotbts as to the precise
effects of the Griffiths Case, is to be found in the difficulties of
determining the exact basis for the decision in Eisner v Macomber.
The Court had held therein that there could be no income within
the 16th Amendment unless the transaction claimed to involve
the receipt of income included an element called "realization." It
thus became essential to develop some test or tests by which the
presence or absence of that element could be detected in trans-
actions involving the acquisition of wealth by a person.2 0 The
Court's first thoroughgoing consideration of the problem was that
found in the prevailing opinion in the case last mentioned. The
tests evolved were inevitably affected by the specific form ii which
the problem was presented in the case before the Court. That is,
their selection was determined largely by the character of the legal
relation between the corporation and its shareholders. The Court
was merely following ordinary usage in the business and financial
community in treating the shares as representing capital in the
hands of the shareholder, and in adopting the view that such
capital was wholly distinct from the corporate assets. It was
quite correct in holding that a stock dividend of the Eisner v.
Macomber type did not sever anything from the corporate
assets nor give the shareholder anything for his separate use
that he did not already possess. These were the facts that
gave force to the analogy employed by it in describing capital as
the tree and income as the fruit. It was, therefore, held that two
things at least were constitutionally required before a corporate
distribution to its shareholders could be treated as income, and
that these were (a) severance of assets from the corporate assets
and (b) the receipt of the severed assets b6 ' thle shareholder for
his separate use. This is in reality but a single tat stated in terms
of the effect of the distribution upon both the corporation and
the shareholder. The majority opinion does support its conclusion
in part by the fact that the stock dividend in question did not alter
the pre-existing proportionate interest of any shareholder in the
corporation. However important the Court may have considered
this factor in this case, it became exceedingly important in two
20For a criticism of the judicial theory of realization as a condition to
the existence of income, see Irving Fisher, Constructive Income Taxation,
pp. 139-141.
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cases decided on the authority of the Griffiths Case shortly after
the decision therein.2 1
The course of decisions subsequent to Eisner v. Macomber de-
veloped the concept of realization in connection with corporate
distributions to shareholders in ways that can be made consistent
with the reasoning of Eisner v. Macomber only by giving mean-
ings to "severance from corporate assets" and "receipt by the share-
holder for his separate use" that lie outside the ordinary sense of
those expressions. A short time after that decision it was held that
a dividend paid in the paying corporation's own bonds con-
stituted a taxable dividend to the shareholders3- It is doubtful
that common usage would look upon the mere assumption of an
obligation to pay the amount of the bonds at some future date as
involving the immediate separation of anything from the cor-
porate assets. It is, of course, true that such a financial opera-
tion would at once reduce the corporate net worth by the amount
of the future payments agreed to be made. It would be equally
doubtful that common usage would consider those who had re-
ceived the bonds as having had distributed to them any part of
the corporate assets. From their point of view they had received
a promise that the corporation would at some future time trans-
fer to them a part of its assets. However, the market would
recognize those bonds as a separate form of property having a
value of their own. But that could be said with equal truth of
common shares received as a dividend on common stock of the
same class. The real difference between such a stock dividend
and a dividend paid by a corporation in its own bonds is that
in the former case the shareholder's relations to the corporate
assets have remained unchanged, whereas in the latter case his
relations to the corporate assets have been transformed from
those of an ultimate owner to those of an immediate creditor. A
further difference is that a stock dividend, regardless of its type,
capitalizes surplus without affecting the corporation's net asset
position, while a dividend paid in the corporation's own bonds
does not capitalize any part of the surplus and reduces the cor-
porate net assets. Income was held to have been realized because
the shareholder had received for his own separate use something
which "did not invest the holder with merely a different form of
holding stock." That is, the acquisition of a claim against, or of
-"The reference is th the Sprouse and the Strassburger Cases. See foot-
-note 9.
-
2Doerschuk v. United States, (D.C. N.Y. 1921) 274 Fed. 739.
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an interest in, corporate assets different from that evidenced by
the shares on which the dividend had been paid constituted reali-
zation. The same test of realization was applied in tile Reorganiza-
tion Cases. 2 3 It was, of course, assumed in all the cases thus far
discussed that the corporate action affected its own earned stir,
plus, that is, what had once been income to it.
I have thus far ignored the significance of the Court's reli-
ance in Eisner v Macomber upon the fact that the stock dividend
involved therein did not alter the pre-existing proportionate in-
terest of any shareholder Did this mean that a corporate distri-
bution could involve no realization if it (lid not alter the pre-
existing proportionate interest of the shareholder? That is un-
doubtedly what was intended. At any rate the Court itself appears
to have so interpreted it. In Kbshland v. Helvertng24 it stated
that Eisner v Macomber had decided that a dividend in common
on common was not income, and that it had been "said" therein
"that such a dividend was not income because by its payment no
severance of corporate assets was accomplished and tile pre-
existing proportionate interests of the stockholders remained
unalte-led." It also referred to the fact that it had, shortly after
the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1921 (which expressly ex-
cluded all stock dividends from income) pointed out "the distiuc-
tion between a stock dividend which worked no change in the
corporate entity, the same interest in the same corporation being
represented after the distribution by more shares of precisely the
same character and such a dividend where there had either been
changes in the corporate identity or a change in the nature of the
shares issued as dividends whereby the proportional interest of
the stockholder after the distribution was essentially different
from his former interest." The reference is to the opinions ren-
dered in the Reorganization Cases. The opinions therein certiinly
justified the view that realization was present where a share-
holder received dividend shares that gave him a different inter-
est in the corporate assets than lie had had before. That factor,
however, had reference rather to the test of severance of corpo-
rate assets for the separate use of the shareholder than to that
2 3United States v. Phellis, (1921) 257 U. S. 156, 42 S. Ct. 63, 66 L, Ed.
180, Rockefeller v. United States, (1921) 257 U. S. 176, 42 S. Ct. 68, 66
L. Ed. 186, Cullinan v. Walker, (1923) 262 U. S. 134, 43 S. Ct. 495, 67
L. Ed. 906, Marr v. United States, (1925) 268 U. S. 536, 45 S. Ct. 575,
69 L. Ed. 1079; Weiss v. Stearn, (1924) 265 U. S. 242, 44 S. Ct. 490, 69
L. Ed. 1001. For a discussion of these cases, see Rottschaefer, The Coneit
of Income in Federal Taxation, 13 MINNE.SOTA LAW REviEW 637
24(1936) 298 U. S. 441, 56 S. Ct. 767, 80 L. Ed. 1268.
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of a change in the pre-existmg proportionate interest of the share-
holders. The languge in-.the above quotation which refers to a
dividend where there had been "a change in the nature of the
shares issued as dividends whereby the proportional interest of
the stockholder after the distribution was essentially different
from his former interest" suggests that the differences between
the dividend shares and the shares with respect to wIch they
were paid must include such differences as result in a change in
the shareholder's pre-existing -proportionate interest in the cor-
poration. However, the Court asserted further along in that same
opinion that "where a stock dividend gives the stockholder an
interest different from that which his forner stock holdings rep-
resented he receives income." If the "different interest" there
referred means one that includes a change in the shareholder's
preexisting proportionate interest in the corporate net assets,
then there isno inconsistency between the various statements in
the opinion as to the requisites for the existence of a constitu-
tionally taxable stock dividend. If, however, the Court intended
to assert- that a stock dividend was' constitutionally taxable in
every case where the dividend stock conferred upon its recapient
any interest in the corporate net assets, or in the control of cor-
porate affairs, that was different from that which lie had by virtue
of his ownership of the stock with respect to which the dividend
had been paid, then there would be an inconsistency between its
statements in the opinion as to the requisites for the existence of
a constitutionally taxable stock dividend, since a stock dividend
meeting this test would not necessarily meet the test of a change
in the shareholder's pre-existing proportionate interest in the cor-
porate net assets. In the case now being discussed (the Koshland
Case) the shareholder owned preferred stock and received divi-
dends thereon in the corporation's own common stock. The pay-
ment of such a dividend did not reduce the corporate assets by
any amount whatever. It did, however, give the shareholder an
interest in the corporate net assets different from that represented
b3 his preferred stock, and altered his pre-existing proportionate
interest iil the corporation. In so far as it altered his proportion-
ate interest therein, it also changed adversely the proportion-
ate interest therein of all .those who owned common stock at the
time the preferred was paid its stock dividend. The Court, in
holding such stock dividend to constitute income, must have held
that the transaction "accomplished" a severance of corporate
assets. Since no corporate assets actually were severed, from cor-
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porate ownership, the concept "severance from corporate assets"
must denote something that can occur even when corporate assets
are not diminished by the transaction. That something is a re-
adjustment of claims in the net assets by giving some former
claimant thereto a new type of claim therein or new rights of
control over corporate assets and affairs. It probably cannot be
held to denote also the changes in pre-existing proportionate in-
terests in the corporation of the shareholders receiving the divi-
dend, nor in the pre-existing proportionate interests therein of
the other classes of shareholders, which usually, but not always,
characterizes the payment of stock dividends in shares of one
class on shares of another class. If "severance from corporate
assets" be construed to include that type of change, then it would
not merit consideration as a second and distinct test of the exis-
tence of income realization in the various stock dividend cases. It
would, therefore, be a justified interpretation of the decision in
the Koshland Case that a stock dividend may be constitutionally
treated as income if (a) it accomplishes a severance of corporate
assets in the sense that the .payment of the dividend confers upon
the recipient an interest in the corporate net assets different
from that represented by his stock on which such dividend was
paid,.and (b) it alters such shareholder's pre-existing proportion-
ate interest iii the corporate net assets. It is also arguable that
the reasoning in the opinion in that case justifies the same propo-
sition as to the requisites for a constitutionally taxable stock divi-
dend, but it would constitute unwarranted dogmatism to assert
that such reasoning i consistent only -with that view
The courts have developed their theories as to what stock
dividends are constitutionally taxable by reasoning derived from
Eisner v. Macomber That case definitely decided that a stock
dividend that meets a certain test is in the class of stock divi-
dends that are not income within the 16th Amendment. If that
were all that it had decided, it would furnish no basis for con-
cluding what stock dividends were not in that class. The general
resort to the Eisner v Macomber theory of non-taxable stock
dividends in the cases holding certain stock dividends constitu-
tionally taxable proves that the courts have interpreted that case
as having decided more than the proposition set forth above. If it
be deemed to have decided tat the whole class of stock divi-
dends constitutionally non-taxable is exhausted by those that
meet the test imposed by Eisner v. Macomber, then those that
are constitutionally taxable can be determined by the approach
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actually adopted by the courts. The fact that they have used that
approach supports the view that all stock dividends are consti-
tutionally taxable except those includible within the principles
of Eisner v. Macomber That that case and the Koshland Case
failed to make completely clear the factors necessary to render
a stock dividend constitutionally non-taxable appears from de-
velopments subsequent to the case last mentioned. Tile principal
question was whether a stock dividend could be constitutionally
taxed if it did not.alter the pre-existing proportionate interest
of shareholders in the corporation. The matter was finally settled
by two decisions rendered by the Supreme Court a short time
after its decision in the Griffiths Case. These were Helvernig v.
Sprozuse and Strassburger v. Commissioner of Internal Revaenue.-"
The facts in the Sprouse Case were as follows- The corpora-
tion paying the stock dividend had outstanding at the time of its
payment two classes of common stock. The only difference be-
tveen themwas that the one class had, and the other did not have,
the right to vote. The taxpayer owned only voting common stock.
During 1936 the corporation paid a dividend on all its stock in
non-voting common stock, the taxpayer thus receiving a divi-
dend on his voting common in non-voting common. The Board
of Tax Appeals sustained the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
in including the value of such dividend in the taxpayer's 1936
gross income."6 It did so because the stock received differed in
character from that on which it had been paid. The Circuit
Court of Appeals.to which the taxpayer carried the case reversed
the Board's decision. : Its reason was that a stock dividend which
does not produce a change in the pre-existing proportionate in-
terest of the shareholders does not constitute income within the
16th Amendment. Since the distribution involved in the case
effected no change therein, the inclusion of the value of the divi-
dend in the taxpayer's income was held to violate the 16th
Amendment. Its de:.sion was affirmed by the Supreme Court
which held the case to be "ruled" by the Griffiths Case and not
by the Koshland Case. It follows that the dividend in the Sprouse
Case did not come within the meaning of income as used in the
16th Amendment'as construed up to the time of the enactment
'of Section 115 (f) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1936. The Court's
2.These two cases were decided together; for citation see footnote 9.26(1940) 42 B. T. A. 484, where it appears sub. noin. John If. Keister
v. Com'r of Int. Revenue.27Sprouse v. Com'r of Int. Revenue, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1941) 122 F
(2d) 973.
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reason for its position is found in that part of the majority's
opinion in which it explains why the Koshland Case was in-
applicable. It denied that that case had decided that a stock divi-
dend could be constitutionally taxed in every instance in which
the stock received as a dividend differed in any respect from
that with respect to which it had been paid. It asserted that "On
the contrary the decision was that, to render the dividend taxable
as income, there must be a change brought about by the issue
of the shares as a dividend whereby the proportional interest of
the stockholder after the distribution was essentially different
from his former interest." It may. accordingly, be taken as defi-
nitely settled that no stock dividend constitutes income withmn the
16th Amendment as construed at the critical date unless it effects
an essential change in the pre-existing proportionate interests of
the shareholders in the corporation. It is not sufficient that the
character of the interest represented by the dividend stock is dif-
ferent from that represented by the stock on which the dividend
stock was paid. That alone will not make the dividend constitu-
tionally taxable. But nothing in the decision expressly or im-
pliedly holds that a stock dividend could be taxable unless such
difference too were present. It merely holds that it alone is not
a basis for treating the dividend as income within the 16th
Amendment.
The Strassburger Case was decided on the same reasoning.
It is necessary merely to state its facts. The taxpayer was the
sole owner of all of a corporation's outstanding. stock which con-
sisted of common stock 6nly It paid a dividend in its newly
authorized preferred. The lower court held the dividend taxable
on the basis of the Koshland Case which it construed as holding
that a stock dividend was income within the 16th Amendment if
the dividend stock gave the recipient a different interest in the
corporate assets than that represented by the stock on which the
dividend was paid.2 8 Its decision was reversed by the Supreme
Court. The only reason not adduced by it in the Sprouse Case
was that the distribution of the stock dividend brought about no
change in the sole stockholder's interest in the corporation since
he owned it all both before and after the receipt of the stock
dividend.
A question naturally raised by the Sprouse and Strassburgr
Cases is whether they have altered in any respect the tests de-
28Strassburger v. Com'r of Int. Revenue, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1941) 124 F
(2d) 315.
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veloped in Eisner v. Maconiber for determining what stock divi-
dends are constitutionally tax-free. It has already been pointed
out that that case, as subsequently construed and applied by the
Supreme Court, not only decided that every stock dividend which
accomplished no severance of corporate assets and left the pre-
existing proportionate interests of the shareholders unchanged
was a member of the class of constitutionally non-ta;able stock
dividends, but also decided that a stock dividend that did not
meet those tests was not a member. of that class. Furthermore,
no decision of the Supreme Court has held that inclusion in that
class requires compliance with any other test, or that compliance
with any other tests alone will admit any stock dividend to that
class. It may, therefore, be properly asserted that, up to. the deci-
sion of the Sprouse and Strassburger Cases, the class "constitu-
tionally tax-free stock dividends" was identical with the class
"stock dividends which accomplished no severance of corporate
assets and which made no change in the pre-existing proportion-
ate interests of the shareholders in the corporation." The Sprouse
and Strassburger Cases in their reasomng certainly stress the
absence of change in the pre-existing proportionate interest of
the shareholders as the factor that required the conclusion that
the stock dividends therein involved did not constitute income
under the 16th Amendmenft as that had been construed up to
the time of the enactment of Section 115 (f) (1) of the Revenue
Act of 1936. The question is -whether those decisions, and the
Supreme Court's reasoning in 'support thereof, justify an infer-
ence that the absence of such change alone is sufficient to bring
a stock dividend within the class of those constitutionally tax-
free. If the answer therto be in the affinnative, the requirement
that in order to be constitutionally tax-free a stock dividend must
not accomplish a severance of corporate assets will have been
eliminated. Accordingly, if the distribution of the stock dividend
in either of those cases effected the result theretofore denoted by
the concept "severance of corporate assets," the decision therein
will require the inference that that test need no longer be met to
entitle a stock dividend to be held constitutionally tax-free. The
wholly artificial nature of that concept has already been pointed
out. As a -matter of fact no stock dividend involves any actual
separation of assets from the corporate assets, nor anything that'
could be described as an acquisition of corporate assets by the
shareholder receiving the stock dividend. The concept, as applied
by the courts, denoted only that the interest in the corporation
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represented by the dividend stock was essentially different from
that represented by the stock on which the stock dividend had
been paid.2 9 The stock dividend in the Strassburger Case clearly
accomplished a "severance of corporate assets" in the only sense
in which that concept had any meaning as an independent test of
the taxable character of a stock dividend under the 16th Amend-
ment. It is fairly arguable that the dividend in the Sprouse Case
did not effect a severance of corporate assets in even this sense
of the concept since the difference between the two classes of
stock therein might well be considered not essential. The Strass-
burger Case, however, held constitutionally tax-free a stock divi-
dend that accomplished a severance of corporate assets in the
only reasonable sense of that concept, and did so solely because
it did not accomplish a change in the pre-existing proportionate
interests of the shareholder in the corporation. Hence it demands
the conclusion that the sole remaining test of whether a stock
dividend is tax-free under the 16th Amendment, within its mean-
ing as of the critical date, is the effect of its distribution upon the
shareholders' pre-existing proportionate interest in the corpora-
tion. If its distribution effects an essential change therein, it con-
stitutes income within the 16th Amendment as of the critical (late,
if it effects no such change, it does not constitute income with-
in that Amendment as of that date.
The next question concerns the meaning of the concept
"change in the pre-existing proportionate interests of the stock-
holders." The" principal factors with respect to which the rights
of different classes of stockholders vary are (a) their rights to
dividends, (b) their rights on the liquidation of the corpora-
tion, and (c) their voting rights. These are the major factors
that define a shareholder's interest in the corporation. In the case
of a corporation with but one class of stock outstanding, the pro-
portionate interests of shareholders vary directly with the nuni-
ber of shares held by them. In the case of a corporation with two
classes of stock outstanding that differ from each other only in
that one class is voting stock and the other non-voting, the pro-
portionate interest of the shareholders, regardless of the class
of stock owned, in respect of their claims to dividends and to
distribution on liquidation also vary directly with the number
of shares held by them. This is also true, so far as voting rights
are concerned, as among the shareholders owning voting stock,
29See Helvering v. Gowran, (1937) 302 U. S. 238, 58 S. Ct. 154, 82 L.
Ed. 224, and the Reorganization Cases cited in footnote 23.
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but not as among all the stockholders of both classes. If now a
dividend in non-voting stock is paid to all shareholders, and if
the dividend is the same amount for both classes,- the resulting
readjustment of the capital structure will not disturb the pre-
existing proportionate interests of any shareholder with respect
to any of the three factors. This was the situation in the Sprotese
Case in which such a; diidend was held not to be income. If in
this case the equal stock dividend had been paid in voting st6ck,
the result would be different. Assume that the corporation in
'question had outstanding 1000 shares of voting common and
20C0 shares of. non-voting commion, both of equal par value.
"Each share, regardless of its class, is entitled to 1/3000th of
each dividend distribution and to the same fraction in a liquida-
ting distribution. If now a 10 per cent stock dividend is paid in
voting common on both classes of stock, the number of voting
-shares will be increased to. 1300, while the number of non-voting
shares will remain, at 2000. Each share, regardless of its class,
will now be -entitled- to 1/3300th of each dividend and liquida-
ting distribution. However, each owner of voting common will
now own 1.1 share, for each share formerly owned, and each
owner-of non-voting common will now own 1 share non-voting
and .1 share voting common for each share of non-voting common
formerly held. Every stockholder will thus receive 1.1/3300ths
of each dividend and .liquidating distribution for each share for-
merly held, regardless of'its class. But 1/3000th equals 1.1/3300ths.
Hence there has been no change in the pre-existing proportionate
interest of any shareholder so far as these two factors are con-
cerned.-This is not true so far as voting rights are concerned.
The dividend has increased the voting stock to 1300 shares, of
which 200 are now owned by holders of non-voting common who
acquired them by virtue of their- status as holders of such non-
voting common. Each share of voting stock now carries 1/1300th
of the voting power instead of 1/1000th. Each owner of voting
common now owns 1.1 share thereof with respect to each share
formerly held, but that gives him only 1.1/1300ths of the cor-
porate voting power instead of the 1/1000th his single share
formerly carried with it. And 1.1/1300ths is less than 1/1000th.
Furthermore, each holder of a share of non-voting common now
has .1 share of voting common for each share'of non-voting com-
mon formerly held, and has thereby acquired .1/1300th of the
corporate voting power, whereas he formerly had none with re-
spect to his ownership of a share of non-voting common. The
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pre-existing distribution of voting power has been altered. If
that power is included in that "interest in the corporation" which
may not be altered by a stock dividend if that dividend is to be
constitutionally tax-free, then the dividend in question is not so
tax-free. But that at once raises another problem. The pre-
existing proportionate interest in the corporation, so far as
the voting power of stock is a factor in its definition, has been
altered with respect to both the voting and the non-voting com-
mon, to the disadvantage of the former and the advantage of
the latter. Would the distribution of such a stock dividend be
held taxable even in the hands of a holder of voting common
This would be most unjust, but law and justice do not always
coincide.
The payment of a stock dividend on common stock in stoclk
of the same class -when no other class of stock is outstanding is
non-taxable. This was decided in Eisner v. Macomber ,and re-
affirmed in the Grtffiths Case. A question may fairly be raised as
to whether the decision would be the same if there were preferred
stock outstanding at the time of the payment of such a dividend.
The answer can be given only by considering the nature of its
preferences. Assume a case in which it is preferred as to both
dividends and on liquidation, the dividends are limited to a fixed
rate, the amount payable on liquidation also limited to a definite
amount, and it has no voting rights whatever. Au increase in the
number of shares of common stock is without effect upon the
position of a preferred stock of this character. Such an increase
would not alter.the proportionate interest bf the class of preferred
stock in the corporate earnings or net assets or in its voting
power nor would it alter the proportionate interest of any holder
of such preferred in those respects. This would be true whether
the increase were due to a new issue to the public or to the dis-
tribution of a stock dividend. If due to the latter cause, it would
also leave the pre-existing proportionate interests of the common
stockholders unaltered in every respect. It follows that the dis-
tribution of such a stock dividend in this situation would not con-
stitute income.
A variant of the case last considered would be one in which
the outstanding preferred differed from that assumed in the pre-
ceding paragraph in one respect only Assume it to be entitled
to be paid $5 per share before any dividends were paid on the
common, and entitled to share equally with the common after that
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had received $6 per share during any given year. The payment
of a stock dividend on the common in common will increase
the amount required to meet the $6 per share that has to be
paid it before the preferred can share in further distributions
during the year. It will furthermore increase the number oi
shares among which the additional distribution will have to
be spread. Both of these changes alter the pre-existing propor-
tionate claims to earnings and surplus as between the common
shareholders as a class and the preferred shareholders as a class,
and as between the shareholder of the one class and the share-
holder of the other class. I-lowever, it would continue unaltered
the pre-existing proportionate interests among the shareholders
of each class. The question then arises whether the existence of
the requisite change in the shareholders' pre-existing proportion-
ate interest is to be tested by the results of the payment of the
dividend upon the relative claims of the two classes of stock or
by its effect upon the relative claims of the shareholders of each
class taken as the unit. The decisions in the Koshland and
Gowran Cases support the former of these positions. While they
involved stock dividends on one class of stock paid in shares of
another class, the change in the pre-existing proportionate inter-
ests in the' corporation could not have been held to exist if the
test had been applied only to the change in the relative positions
,wcr se of the class of shareholders receiving the stock dividend.
Hence it may be safely concluded that such a stock dividend would
constitute, income under the new test if that can be satisfied by
such change involving but one of the factors defining a share-
holder's interest in the corporation.
Another variant of the original case is that in which the out-
standing preferred is without any voting rights whatever, is pre-
ferred as to dividends up. to a fixed and limited amount, and is
preferred on liquidatidn up to a fixed amount but entitled to share
equally with the common after the latter has received a fixed
amount The payment of a dividend in comnmon on the common
in such case wouldincrease the proportionate interest of the com-
mon stock in that part of the net assets existing at the time of
liquidation which was in excess of the amount required to meet
the claims of the preferred to a fixed amount prior to any distribu-
tion to the common. The pre-existing proportionate interest
therein is altered -between the two classes of stock, and also
vith respect to any holder of shares of each class. The change
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would benefit the common at the expense of the preferred. No
change would occur in the relative positions of. the common stock-
holders ter se. But, as heretofore pointed out, that would
probably be held immaterial. Hence it is highly probable that a
dividend of common stock paid on the same kind of common
stock would constitute income under the facts herein assumed
if the new test can be satisfied by a change involving but one of
the factors defining a shareholder's interest in the corporation.
It has never yet been judicially determined whether a dividend
on preferred stock paid in preferred stock of the same class con-
stitutes income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment. The
simplest case would be one in which the common stock was the
only other class of stock outstanding. Assume a case in which the
capital structure at the time when such a dividend js paid consists
of 2000 shares of common stock- and 1000 shares of preferred, the
latter's preferences being limited to a $5 per share dividend and
the recovery of par on liquidation. Assume next the distribution
of a 10 per cent dividend on the preferred paid in the same pre-
ferred. The result will be to increase the prior claim of the
preferred in the earnings and surplus, and in the assets remaining
on the liquidation of the corporation. This alters the pre-existing
proportionate interest of the preferred in the corporation relative
to the common shareholders. It does not alter the pre-existing pro-
portionate interest among the preferred shareholders titer se.
Since, however, the alteration of the preferred's proportionate in-
terest relative to the common involves a similar alteration of the
pre-existing proportionate interest of each preferred shareholder;
the receipt of the dividend can be constitutionally treated as in-
come. It will not be necessary to modify the assumed facts of the
case stated in this paragraph by changing the preferences accorded,
the preferred stock. Such changes would affect the character of
changes that such a dividekid would effect in the preferred share-
holder's pre-existing proportionate interest in the corporation. They
would not eliminate such changes. Hence such a stock dividend as
is now being considered would in all cases constitute income with-
in the 16th Amendment.
The preceding discussion of possible cases in which the consti-
tutional character of a stock dividend might arise has involved
making certain assumptions that were not expressed. One of
these was that all the outstanding stock was not owned by a
single person. The Strassburger Case held that the payment of a
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dividend on the common in a newly issued preferred did not con-
stitute income where all the common was owned by one person,
since he owned the entire interest in the corporation bdth before
and after the payment of the dividend. Assume a corporation
with both common and preferred stock outstanding, all of wluch
is owned by one person. A stock dividend on the common paid in
either common or, preferred, and one on the preferred paid in
either preferred or common, will effect no change in the sole
shareholder's pre-existing proportionate interest in the orporation
under the test applied in the Strassburger Case. Hence no such
stock dividend can be constitutionally taxed as income. This is
a most sensible position.
It was also tacitly assumed, wherever there was more than
one class of stock outstanding at the time when the stock dividend
was paid, that the several classes were not owned by the same
persons in the same proportion. The effects of a contrary as-
sumption must now be considered. Assume a corporation with
2403 shares of common and 1200 shares of preferred stock out-
standing, and that A owns one-half of each class, B owns one-
third of each class, and C owns one-sixth of each class. A 50
per cent dividend in common is now paid on the common. Its
effet upon A, B, and C, as owners of common stock, is shown by.
the following table.
Shares Owned No. Shares Shares Owned
Before Dividend Received as After Dividend
No. % Dividend No. %
A -------------- 1200 50 60) 1803 50
-B ------------------ 800 33% 400 1200 33 %
C---------- 400 16% 200 600 16"'73
The dividend does not alter their pre-existing proportunate interest
in the corporation so far as that is represented by their common
stock. Their proportionate interest as represented by their pre-
ferred stock is not changed. Hence the dividend has made no
change in their pre-existing proportionate interest in the corpora-
tion as represented by both the common and preferred stock. The
distribution of that dividend would, therefore, not constitute ii-
come within the 16th Amendment. This is true also of a stock
dividend paid in the same preferred. It is not necessary to illustrate
this by a tabular presentation. Let it now be assumed that a 25
per cent dividend is paid on the common in the preferred. The
effects upon A, B, and C will be as follows
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No. Common Pfd. Pfd. Shares
Shares Shares Owned Pfd. Shares Owned After
Owned Before Dividend Received as Dividend
No. % Dividend No. %
A ................ 1200 600 50 300 900 50
B ................ 800 400 33% 200 600 33%
C ................ 400 200 16% 100 300 16%
The dividend could have no effect upon the pre-existing propor-
tionate interest of the shareholders so far as that was represented
by the common stock. The table shows that their pre-existing pro-
portionate interest in the corporation, so far as represented by
their preferred stock, is left unchanged. Hence the dividend effected
no change in their pre-existing proportionate interest in the corpo-
ration as represented by both the common and preferred stock.
Its distribution would, therefore, not constitute income within the
16th Amendment. This would be true also had the dividend been
paid on the preferred in common. These instances show that the
important thing is not the existence of more than one class of
stock at the time that the stock dividend is paid, but how the
ownership of the classes is distributed. The results indicated in
this paragraph will occur only if all classes of stock outstanding
at the time when a stock dividend is distributed are owned b y the
same individuals in the same proportion. This is not likely to
occur except in a family corporation. The case in which there is
but one class of stock outstanding at the time of distributing a
stock dividend produces exactly the same effects as those found to
exist in the cases first considered in this paragraph. Hence a
stock dividend on such single class paid in a newly issued stock
of a different class is not constitutionally taxable.
The last case that merits special consideration is that in which
the stock distributed as a dividend consists of treasury stock.
Such stock is technically still outstanding. The simplest case is that
in which the corporation has only one class of stock outstanding.
Assume a corporation which has issued 11,000 shares of its com-
mon stock. It buys in 1,000 shares. Technically it still has 11,000
shares outstanding, so that each share represents a 1/11,000th
interest in the corporation. Actually, were the corporation to
liquidate while this condition existed, the net assets would be
distributed among the 10,000 shares in the hands of the public.
If the 1,000 treasury shares are now distributed as a dividend,
each holder of any of the 10,000 shares in the hands of the public
will get .1 of a share as a dividend for each share held by him.
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Prior to the distribution the ownerslip of a single share of the
stock in the hands of the public represented ownership of a
1/11,000th interest in the corporation. This was, however, true
in a technical sense only. After the distribution the owner of each
such share will own 1.1 shares, which represent a 1.1/11,000th
interest in the corporation. The proportional interest of each
shareholder is different from what it was before the treasury
stock was distributed as dividends. The result is, however, at-
tributable solely to accepting a legal technicality as a prenise.
There is no consideration of fairness that would justify including
such a stock dividend in the class of those constitutionally taxable.
The Board of Tax Appeals (now the Tax Court) held such a
dividend not to constitute income within the 16th Amendment. It
rejected the Commissioner's contention that the treasury shares,
being held for investment, constituted property and that the divi-
dend was taxable on that basis.30 The Treasury has finally ruled
it non-taxable.3' The rule would be different if the treasury stock
was a preferred stock which had been distributed as a dividend
on the common stock at a time when some of the same class of
preferred was outstanding. The decision in the Gozeran Gase3 2
would undoubtedly be used as the basis for treating such a stock
dividend as income within the 16th Amendment. The only differ-
ence between it and the assumed case is that the preferred stock
distributed to the common shareholders therein was not treasury
stock.
It has already been stated that the major factors defining the
interest in a corporation represented by any given share of stock
are its rights to dividends, its rights on liquidation, and its voting
rights. The distribution of a stock dividend which changes the pre-
existing proportionate interest of shareholders with. respect to all
those factors is clearly taxable under the Constitution. The Kosh-
land Case involved a stock dividend that effected a change in
respect of all three factors. The question is whether it is sufficient,
in order to make a stock dividend constitutionally taxable, that a
change occur in the pre-existing proportionate interest of the
shareholders so far as that change involves but one of thoso factors.
This is an issue that has thus far received no consideration from
3OBruckheimer v. Com'r of Int. Revenue, (1942) 46 B. T. A. 234. For
an earlier decision by the Board in accord with this, see James Kay, (1933)
28 B. T. A. 331.
3lTreasury Decision 5290, approved August 13, 1943, which amends
Reg. 103, Sec. 19.115-7
i-iSee footnote 29.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
courts or administrative bodies, at least so far as the writer is
aware. The language of the Supreme Court is that, "to render
the dividend taxable as income, there must be a change brought
about by the issue of the shares as a dividend whereby the pro-
portional interest of the stockholder after the distribution (is)
essentially different from his former interest."' It is a fair infer-
ence therefrom that a change in a shareholder's pre-existing pro-
portionate interest is sufficient if it involves any factor that might
be considered as essential in defining that interest. It is not neces-
sary that the change involve all factors defining it. The distribution
of a stock dividend that alters pre-existing proportionate clains to
dividends, or that alters pre-existing proportionate claims in the
assets distributable on liquidation, certainly will be held to give
the distributee a proportional interest "essentially different from
his former interest." An alteration therein involving either of them
would render the distribution constitutionally taxable. A distribu-
tion that altered only the pre-existing proportional distribution of
voting power might well be held to be insufficient by itself to
render the distribution taxable. The Court would have had to
determine that matter if the dividend in the Sprouse Case had
been in voting common. As it is, there is nothing in the decisions
or opinions of the courts to help in solving it.
It may be well to make a brief summary of the discussion up
to this point. The problem with which it was concerned arose be-
cause of the decision in the Griffiths Case.3 4 The Supreme Court
held therein that a stock dividend paid on the common stock in
stock of the same class could not be taxed as income under the
statute in force during 1939, the year in which the dividend was
paid. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue had assessed a tax
in reliance upon Section 115 (f) (1) of the Internal Revenue
Code35 which provided that a distribution by a corporation to .its
shareholders in its own stock should "not be treated as a dividend
to the extent that it does not constitute income to he shareholder
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion." The Court construed this to exclude from income all stock
dividends that did not constitute income within the meaning of the
16th Amendment as of the time of the enactment of the Revenue
Act of 1936. That was made the critical date because that Act
was the first to introduce the provision relied upon by the Comnis-
33See Helvering v. Sprouse, (1943) 318 U. S. 604, 63 S. Ct. 791, 87L. Ed...34(1943) 318 U. S. 371, 63 S. Ct. 636, 87 L. Ed ........
35U. S. C. A., Title 26, Section llf (f) (1).
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sioner in imposing the tax. The statutory rule in effect during the
fifteen years prior thereto had excluded all stock dividends from
income. The meaning of the 16th Amendnent as of the critical
date thus became the criterion for determining the scope of Sec-
tion 115 (f) (1). That resolved itself largely into a problem of
discovering the test of non-taxability and of taxability developed
by Eisner v. Macomber and the Koshland, Gowran, Sprouse and
Strassburger Cases. The net effect of the decisions and reasoning
in those cases is that Section 115 (f) (1) excludes from income
any stock dividend that does not change the shareholder's pre-
existing proportionate interest in the corporation, and excludes
from income no other type of stock dividend. Whether a stock
dividend effects such a change can be ascertained only by exam-
ining the capital structure of the corporation before and after tle
payment of such- dividend. Eisner v. .A'acomnber and the Griffiths
Case decide that the requisite change does not occur if a dividend
is paid on the common stock in common stock of the same class at
a time when there is no other class of stock outstanding. The
Sprouse Case has definitely- settled that the payment of a dividend
in non-voting common on both the voting and non-voting common,
at a time when no other class of stock was outstanding, does not
effect the requisite change where the only difference between
the two classes of stock was that the one class only had voting
power. The Strassburger Case puts into the class of non-taxable
stock dividends a dividend on the common stock paid in preferred
stock at a time when the common alone was outstanding where all
of it is owned by a single shareholder. The decision would have
been the same had there been several classes outstanding at that
time if all the issued stock had been then owned by a single share-
holder. The Koshland and Gowran Cases indicate two situations
in which a stock dividend does produce the change requisite to
'treating the dividend as income. In each of them the dividend was
paid in shares of one class on shares of a wholly different class
at a time when shares of both classes were outstanding. These
decisions are important, but there remain numerous situations to
which the courts have not yet given authoritative answers. Some
of thege were analyzed and considered in the course of this article.
In conclusion, it should be noted that, while the discussion has
been constantly concerned with the meaning of the term "income"
in the 16th Amendment, the conclusions relate not to the present
constitutional status of stock dividends but to their constitutional
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status as of a prior date. The principles were developed forothe
purpose of determining the scope of a statutory provision whose
scope the Supreme Court had defined in terms of the meaning of
the word "income" in the 16th Amendment as of a given prior
date. The present constitutional status of stock dividends will be
dealt with in the next section of this article.
(To be continued)
